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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the legal issues left by recent territorial change in eastern
Europe is the status of persons of a former majority group who become a
minority. This issue has presented particular difficulties where, the
remaining population is of an ethnic group that formerly held a
predominant role vis-d-vis an ethnic group that, as a result of the
territorial change, has become a majority. Thus, Serbs find themselves a
minority in the new states of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, while
Russians find themselves a minority in the new states formed out of the
Soviet Union on Russia's periphery.
The situation of these populations raises issues of appropriate
treatment of minorities, and that of the status they should appropriately
enjoy in the new states. In particular, does the fact that these populations
are of an ethnic group that may have suppressed the national aspirations of
the now majority ethnic group justify negative action towards them, or
deprive them of rights they would otherwise enjoy as a minority group?
In addition, the situation of these populations raises questions
regarding the status of territories because of potential claims to
independence by the Serbs or Russians, and because of the potentiality that
Yugoslavia or Russia might intervene militarily to protect their
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University. LL.B., M.A. 1966, Harvard Law School.
The author is grateful to the United States Information Agency for an opportunity to lecture in
Moldova on minority rights in 1993. The author served in 1994-1995 as an expert for the
Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe to make recommendations on the status of
Crimea.
456 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
compatriots. This article focuses on these issues as they have played
themselves out in certain of the new states on Russia's periphery.
II. PRECEDENT
The twentieth century has witnessed two previous situations in
which loss of territory by states has left populations of their nationals in a
minority position. The first is the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian
empire in central Europe at the end of World War I, and the second is the
breakup of the European colonial empires in Asia and Africa in the years
following World War II. In each instance, nationals of the formerly
dominant state found themselves in a territory in whose political system the
leading role was played by groups that had formerly been in a subordinate
situation.
When the Austro-Hungarian empire fell many Germans and
Hungarians became minorities in states carved out of the empire.' The
borders drawn up for a new, truncated Hungary, for example, were so
tight that fifteen million Hungarians found themselves outside Hungary,
primarily in Slovakia, Romania, and Serbia. 2 The situation of the minority
populations resulting from the border-drawing at Versailles was deemed to
require international attention. A body of law was created, backed up by a
League of Nations enforcement mechanism to protect these minorities.3
The states conferring at Versailles drafted a separate treaty to protect the
minorities in each state where they had come to exist. The new states
undertook not to discriminate against the minorities and, in addition, to
facilitate the perpetuation of their ethnic identity.4
This minority protection system was, in motivation, less
humanitarian than it was strategically oriented. The Versailles conferees
1. Danilo Turk, Le droit des minorit~s en Europe, in LES MINORITI5 EN EUROPE:
DROITS LINGUISTIQUES ET DROITS DE L'HOMME 447 (Henri Giordan ed., 1992).
2. GIDON GOTrLIEB, NATION AGAINST STATE: A NEW APPROACH TO ETHNIC
CONFLICTS AND THE DECLINE OF SOVEREIGNTY 29-30 (1993).
3. See Nathaniel Berman, A Perilous Ambivalence: Nationalist Desire, Legal Autonomy,
and the Limits of the Interwar Framework, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353 (1992); Nathaniel Berman,
"But the Alternative Is Despair:" Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of International Law,
106 HARV. L. REV. 1792 (1993).
4. Treaty of Versailles (Poland), 1919, reg'd no. 36 League of Nations; Treaty of Saint
Germain-en-Laye (Austria), 1919, reg'd no. 37 League of Nations; Treaty of Saint Germain-en-
Laye (Czechoslovakia), 1919, reg'd no. 38 League of Nations; Treaty of Saint Germain-en-Laye
(Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), 1919, reprinted in 1 INT'L LEGIS. 312 (M.O.
Hudson ed., 1931); Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine (Bulgaria), 1919, reg'd no. 40 League of
Nations; Treaty of Paris (Romania), 1919, 5 L.N.T.S. 335; Treaty of Trianon (Hungary), 1920,
reg'd no. 152 League of Nations; Treaty of Sflvres (Greece), 1920, 28 L.N.T.S. 225; Treaty of
Lausanne (Turkey), 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 12.
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feared that suppression of Germans and Hungarians might prompt these
minorities to seek assistance from Germany or Hungary, and that
international tension could ensue. Unfortunately, the League did not
follow through sufficiently to prevent precisely such a problem from
becoming a precipitating factor in World War II, namely, the
marginalization of Germans in the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia, which
provided a rationale for Germany's occupation of the Sudetenland in 1938.
Nonetheless, the League of Nations made significant efforts at
protecting the minority populations. It reviewed petitions from those who
alleged their rights had been infringed.' Under the minority protection
treaties, the Permanent Court of International Justice was given
compulsory jurisdiction to resolve disputes, and the court heard a number
of such cases. The court gave advisory opinions as well on minority
issues. In one advisory opinion, it found Albania to have violated the
rights of Albania's Greek minority when Albania ordered the closing of all
private schools.6
A similar situation might have developed again after World War
II, when the borders of Germany were constricted on the east under the
post-war settlement. A substantial portion of Germany, inhabited
primarily by Germans, was ceded to Poland. However, the Germans were
expelled and thus did not become a minority population of Poland. Their
expulsion was rationalized on the basis that Poland needed land
compensation for having lost its own eastern territory to the Soviet Union
expulsion of resident Germans was also carried out from states that
Germany had occupied, particularly from Poland, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia. One rationale for that expulsion was that resident
Germans had collaborated with Germany's army. In any event, the
expulsion reduced the minority populations that had existed between the
wars. In all, some fifteen million Germans were expelled after World War
II, many in conditions of severe deprivation. An estimated two million
died in the process.,
When colonialism ended in Asia and Africa in the 1950s and
1960s, a comparable issue emerged. In many, though not all, of the
colonies, nationals of the colonial power had settled in substantial
numbers, and while many of these voluntarily departed, others sought to
5. Natan Lerner, The Evolution of Minority Rights in International Law, in PEOPLES AND
MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 77, 85 (C. BrOlmann et al., eds., 1993).
6. Advisory Opinion, Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 64, at
19-20, 23.
7. See generally ALFRED DE ZAYAS, NEMESIS AT POTSDAM: THE EXPULSION OF THE
GERMANS FROM THE EAST (1989).
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remain. No international mechanism comparable to the post-World War I
system was established to protect these Europeans. On occasion, the
former colonial powers intervened during times of disturbances. In the
Congo, Belgium intervened in 1964 at Stanleyville, and again in 1978 in
Shaba province, on a rationale of protecting endangered Belgians and other
foreigners.
This method of protection of the settler populations raised a
suspicion that the former colonial power was seeking to foster its own
interests. In both instances of Belgian intervention in the Congo, Belgium
was suspected of trying to influence the outcome of events to its favor.8
III. RUSSIANS AS A MINORITY POPULATION
The breakup of the Soviet Union left twenty-five million Russians
as ethnic minorities in newly independent states in the Caucusus, the
Baltics, Central Asia, and on Russia's southwest frontier.9  Like the
Germans after the two world wars, and the Europeans upon the demise of
colonialism, these Russians were a suspect group. Resentment was
directed against them for two centuries of Russian political domination.
Some Russians settled during the Soviet period, many dispatched as
technicians or specialists. Others are the descendants of Russians who
pre-dated the Soviet period in these territories having settled as the
Russian empire expanded southward in the nineteenth century.
Russians have been replaced in many jobs by members of the
newly predominant ethnic group. Some of the states have required
knowledge of the newly dominant language as a condition for holding
certain jobs. Some have made it difficult for Russians to acquire
citizenship.
Individual Russians have adapted to the new circumstances in
varying ways. Some are more ready than others to learn the local
language. Many feel themselves to be at too advanced an age to learn the
language but want their children to do so, rather than to have them
educated in a solely Russian-language environment.
8. JOHN QUIGLEY, THE RuSES FOR WAR: AMERICAN INTERVENTIONISM SINCE WORLD
WAR 11 119-24 (Stanleyville intervention 1964), 165-70 (Shaba intervention 1978).
9. Russia considers sanctions to protect kin in "near abroad;" AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
June 7, 1995, available in NEXIS, News Library. Highly approximate Russian population
percentages are: Azerbaijan 7%, Uzbekistan 8%, Turkmenistan 10%, Kazakhstan 38%,
Tajikistan 8%, Kirghizia 22%, Moldova 13%, Latvia 33%, Lithuania 9%, Estonia 33%, Belarus
12%, Ukraine 21%, Georgia 7%, Armenia 2%. See Russians feel alone in Estonia, WASH.
TIMES, June 1, 1992, at Al. On the situation in the Baltics, see Marc Holzapfel, Note, The
Implications of Hunan Rights Abuses Currently Occurring in the Baltic States Against the Ethnic
Russian National Minority, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 329 (1995-1996).
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The governments of the states in question have shown some
restraint in pressing the use of the local language, not only because of
pressure from the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), but as well from practical considerations. Russian remains the
language of the region, and the small new states risk the danger of
isolating themselves from economic, cultural, and scientific life if the
population is unable to operate in Russian. Further, many of the Russian
speakers in their territory possess skills important for the state's economic
development. As the first flush of nationalism has been replaced by the
reality of stagnant economies, this consideration has assumed prominence.
In post-independence Africa, the colonial languages have retained an
important role, providing a lingua franca for Africans speaking many
different languages. Russian can be expected to play a similar role in the
territories of the former Russian Empire, as it allows communications
across ethnic lines within each of the new states, as well as among them.
For the Russians, the motivation for maintaining the status of the
Russian language is in part related to their identity and sense of belonging,
but as well, and primarily, to a concern that they will be unable to make a
living if they are required to achieve fluency in the local language. In a
recent article, Hurst Hannum makes the important point that a desire for
self-determination frequently springs from a defensive motivation. ° It
serves as a protection for populations that are endangered because of
pressure from some other population.
IV. THE LAW OF MINORITY PROTECTION
The minority Russians have received support from international
organizations. The Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe"
has assumed the role of defusing ethnic tensions through the practice of
preventive diplomacy. It has viewed the status of minority Russians as an
issue that could threaten the peace of the region. It created the post of
High Commissioner on National Minorities, whose incumbent has urged
governments in the newly independent states to ease requirements related
10. Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 63-64 (1993).
11. As of Jan. 1, 1995, the name Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was
changed to Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
12. ROB ZAAGMAN & HANNIE ZAAL, THE CSCE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON NATIONAL
MINORITIES: PREHISTORY AND NEGOTIATIONS, IN THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE: THE
HELSINKI SUMMIT OF THE CSCE AND ITS AFTERMATH 95, 104 (Arie Bloed ed., 1994) (stating
that the idea was to provide an impartial intermediary to mediate between the parties to reduce
tension before it might lead to armed conflict).
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to language use and to acquisition of citizenship. 3 The OSCE has leverage
in this endeavor because these new states seek admission to Europe's
political and economic institutions."
In assuming this stance of support for the Russians, the OSCE is
being guided by, and is building upon, existing law protecting ethnic
minorities. Ethnic minorities are, of course, entitled to be treated in a
non-discriminatory fashion, but beyond that they are entitled to protection
against efforts to limit the development of their culture. In perhaps the
most important legal proposition on this issue, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights provides, "[I]n those States in which ethnic,
religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities
shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own
religion, or to use their own language.""
Ethnic conflict in eastern Europe has brought a proliferation of
new documents from both the United Nations and European institutions to
address minority rights, and to expand protection. In 1992, the United
Nations General Assembly adopted a Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities' 6 which
recognized for minority groups a right to enjoy their culture, to practice
their religion, to use their language, to maintain their associations, and to
participate in the public life of the state they inhabit." The OSCE adopted
something akin to a bill of rights for national minorities' and the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe opened for signature a
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. 9
13. Helsinki Decisions, July 10, 1992, pt. 2, reprinted in 13 HUM. RGTS. L.J. 288, 289
-(1992). On the origin and creation of this post, see ZAAGMAN & ZAAL, supra note 12, at 95-
111. On the nature of the post, see ZAAGMAN, & ZALL, supra note 12, at 113-75.
14. See, e.g., Russia, 23 JANE'S DEFENCE WKLY. 19 (Mar. 25, 1995), available in
NEXIS, News Library (stating that President Eltsin agreed to the stationing of OSCE observers in
Chechnia in hope of gaining trade concessions from the European Union).
15. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 27, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
16. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and
Linguistic Minorities, art. 1, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/135 (1992), reprinted in
14 HUM. RGTS. L.J. 55 (1993).
17. Id. at art. 2.
18. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of
the CSCE, ch. IV, in THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE:
ANALYSIS AND BASIC DOCUMENTS, 1972-1993 456-60 (Arie Bloed ed., 1993).




The Council of Europe's 1992 European Charter for Regional or
Minority Languages obliges states to promote minority languages in legal
proceedings, education, culture, and the media.2 The Charter seeks the
"facilitation and/or encouragement of the use of . . . minority languages,
in speech and writing, in public and private life." 2' The Charter requires
states to make education available in minority languages.2
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has
reported on human rights in eastern Europe with particular attention to the
status of minorities.2 3  The Parliamentary Assembly drafted an Eleventh
Protocol to the European human rights treaty to deal with minority rights .
However, differences over the coverage led to the shelving of work on a
final text.Y
The instruments embodying principles of the law on protection of
minorities suggest no exception where the minority group is made up of
nationals of a state that formerly held sovereignty in the territory in
question. Indeed, the history of minority protection from the League days
suggests that one of the primary purposes of this body of law is to protect
precisely such persons. The proliferation of legal instruments on point in
the wake of the recent developments in eastern Europe confirms this
conclusion and strongly suggests that it is not permissible to suppress an
ethnic group because of perceived unfair treatment in the past by the state
in which that ethnic group is a majority.
V. MINORITIES AND SELF-DETERMINATION
For the new states, one factor in their policy towards their Russian
minorities is a fear that Russia might intervene, perhaps even militarily, in
support of these Russians. These fears were heightened in April 1995
when Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev, speaking of ill treatment
20. European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, Eur. T.S., No. 148, opened for
signature Oct. 2, 1992, reprinted in Hannum, supra note 10, at 86.
21. Id. at art. 7.
22. Id. at art. 9.
23. See, e.g., Report on the legislation of the Republic of Slovenia, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 437
(1993); Report on the legislation in the Czech Republic, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 442 (1993); Report
on Human Rights in Slovakia, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 446 (1993).
24. Council of Europe, Commission for Democracy through Law, Draft Convention for the
Protection of Minorities, 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. 265 (1991); see also Andras B. Bake, The
European Convention on Human Rights and the Protection of Minorities under International Law,
8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 227, 236-37 (1993) (arguing that a minority rights protocol to the European
convention is advisable).
25. Council of Europe Assembly asks for EU membership to be examined, Agence Europe,
Reuter Textline, Jan. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Europe File.
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of Russians in these states, said "There may be cases when the use of
direct military force will be needed to defend our compatriots abroad."
26
Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Churanov backed up Kozyrev's view,
stating that Russian speakers were being humiliated in some of the new
states, and that diplomatic measures might not always be sufficiently
persuasive to correct the situation.27 By 1996, however, Russia's debacle
in Chechnia brought greater caution on Russia's part and seemed to reduce
the likelihood of military intervention in support of Russian speakers.
Minority protection, as it has come to be practiced in Europe, is
not aimed at any right to political separation for a minority group. The
OSCE viewed infringement of the status of minorities as a prime factor in
hostilities, particularly in eastern Europe.2 Like the League of Nations
before it, the OSCE European institutions viewed preservation of the peace
as the primary reason for protecting minority rights. In a policy
proclamation on minority rights, the Heads of State and Government of the
Council of Europe stated "[w]e express our awareness that the protection
of national minorities is an essential element of stability and democratic
security in our continent."29  The Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities recited in its preamble that the protection
of minorities was to be accomplished "within the rule of law, respecting
the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of states. 30
National minorities were to eschew separation from the states
whose territory they inhabited. This position was at odds with the classical
idea of self-determination, which yields several options, one of which is
political independence. Thus, the OSCE undertook the rather delicate task
of promoting the rights of minorities, but only if the minorities remained
with the political status quo.
For Russians in states on the periphery of the Russian Federation,
the issue of possible political separation arose most sharply in Moldova.
26. Kozyrev fuels fears of harder line in Kremlin: remarks on use of force alarm ex-soviet
states, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1995, at 2.
27. Deputy defence minister supports use of force to protect Russians abroa, (BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Apr. 25, 1995), available in NEXIS, News Library.
28. ZAAGMAN & ZAAL, supra note 12, at 95 (stating that "it is ethnic conflicts which are
currently the single most important cause of violent conflicts in Europe").
29. Summit Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the 32 Member States of the
Council of Europe, Oct. 8-9, 1993; Vienna Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of
the member States of the Council of Europe on the Reform of the Control Mechanism of the
ECHR, on National Minorities; and on a Plan of Action against Racism, preamble, para.
reprinted in 4, 14 HUM. RGTS. L.J. 373 (1993).




In most of these states, Russians found themselves dispersed through the
state's territory, but in Moldova's eastern sector, Russians and Ukrainians
formed a slight majority over ethnic Romanians, who constitute overall the
majority population of Moldova. In 1990 a government formed claiming
to represent this territory and succeeded in establishing control there."
Other states refused to recognize the Transdnestr Republic as a state, and
the OSCE worked to keep it within Moldova.
A similar situation arose in the Crimean peninsula, which was
transferred from Russia to Ukraine in 1954. The majority population is
Russian, and many desire separation from Ukraine. However, these
Russians, unlike those in Moldova, have not sought an independent state,
but rather an affiliation with Russia. Russia, however, has manifested
little interest in incorporating Crimea, leading the Russians to demand
republic status within Ukraine that, the Russians hope, might be organized
as a federation. In addition, they sought a special relationship with Russia
that would allow trade advantage and access to Russian higher educational
institutions. In both Moldova and Ukraine, potential confrontation has
been averted for the present. Negotiations are ongoing, leading in the
direction of an anticipated arrangement whereby the minority entity would
enjoy certain protections, and a measure of self-rule.12 In Moldova, the
greatest fear of the Russians and Ukrainians is that Moldova might one day
merge with Romania, leaving them a quite small minority. There is an
understanding that if such a union should come about, the status of
Transdnestr would be revisited.
One potential innovation in self-determination practice has been
proposals, made with respect both to Transdnestr and Crimea, for an
autonomy or self-rule arrangement for the minority territory, but with
international oversight. Russians in Crimea sought an agreement between
Crimea and Ukraine. The Ukraine government resisted such an
agreement, fearing that it would be taken as implicit recognition by it of an
international status for Crimea. Transdnestr Foreign Minister Valerii
Litskay has said that proposals from the Moldovan side for a solution
entirely within the framework of the Moldova constitution do not provide
adequate guarantees that Moldova will not override whatever rights are
written into an agreement between Moldova and Transdnestr, or into the
31. V. NEDELCHUK, RESPUBLIKA MOLDOVA [Republic of Moldova] 71 (1992) (text of
proclamation of Sept. 2, 1990 in Tiraspol of Transdnestr Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic).
32. Signing of memorandum on Dnestr settlement postponed (BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, July 1, 1996), available in NEXIS, News Library.
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Moldova constitution." The OSCE seems a likely candidate for such an
oversight role?'
International oversight, of course, is not a new concept for
protection of minorities, but the specific modality proposed here would
differ from past arrangements. An agreement would be drawn up between
the central government and the minority entity, and a specific international
actor would be empowered to entertain complaints by either side that the
other was failing to observe the agreement.
VI. CONCLUSION
The striving of a population for self-determination, with an aim
either of political independence or of an improved status within a state, is
not necessarily a manifestation of chauvinism and xenophobia, or an
inability to get along with others. In many instances, it reveals rather an
effort at survival. Indeed, the nationalism reflected in the ruling circles of
the new states on Russia's periphery is largely based on a striving for self-
assertion in response to longtime domination by Russia.
An important aspect of the situation of the Russian minorities is
that international institutions have intervened and have played an active
role. The state practice suggests that rights of minorities are recognized as
international norms, and that these rights apply to protect a minority
population associated with a formerly dominant state. The newly
independent states have manifested a willingness to accommodate the
needs of the minority Russians. An initial striving to promote the local
ethnic group at the expense of the Russian minority has given way to a
policy of accommodating the interests of the Russian minority.
33. Dnestr minister says Moldovan crisis proves need for international guarantees (BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Mar. 19, 1996), available in NEXIS, News Library.
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